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THEISM AND EXPLANATIONIST DEFENSES  
OF MORAL REALISM
Andrew Brenner
Some moral realists have defended moral realism on the basis of the pur-
ported fact that moral facts figure as components in some good explanations 
of non-moral phenomena. In this paper I explore the relationship between 
theism and this sort of explanationist defense of moral realism. Theistic ex-
planations often make reference to moral facts, and do so in a manner which 
is ineliminable in an important respect—remove the moral facts from those 
explanations, and they suffer as a result. In this respect theistic moral expla-
nations seem to differ from the sorts of moral explanations typically offered 
by moral explanationists.
1. Introduction
Let’s think of moral realism as the thesis that moral claims aim to report 
moral facts, some moral claims are true, and the truth values of some such 
claims are not explained by or dependent upon any human agent’s moral 
beliefs or stipulations. So, for example, the claim “murdering someone 
for fun is morally wrong” is true, and it is not true because any human 
believes it to be true, declares or stipulates it to be true, would believe it to 
be true under epistemically ideal conditions, etc.
Some moral realists have defended moral realism on the basis of the 
purported fact that moral facts figure as components in some good expla-
nations of non-moral phenomena.1 Such philosophers, call them “moral 
explanationists,” argue that some non-moral phenomena are best ex-
plained in terms which make reference to moral facts.2 So, for example, 
I believe that Hitler was morally depraved because it is true that Hitler 
was morally depraved. This sort of explanationism can be given a weaker 
1See, for example, Railton, “Moral Realism”; Boyd, “How to Be a Moral Realist”; Sturgeon, 
“Moral Explanations” and “Moral Explanations Defended”; and Brink, Moral Realism and the 
Foundations of Ethics. For a useful overview of this subject see Majors, “Moral Explanation.”
2It’s important to focus our attention on whether or not non-moral phenomena are best 
explained in terms which make reference to moral facts. It is a much less interesting and 
controversial thesis that some moral facts are best explained in terms of other moral facts, 
as in, for example, the fact that it is wrong to murder John is explained by the fact that it is 
wrong to murder anyone.
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and a stronger reading. The weaker reading is that the availability of 
moral explanations of the sort cited by explanationists shows that phi-
losophers who think there can be no such explanations are incorrect. This 
is important because some philosophers (Gilbert Harman in particular)3 
argue that moral explanations are problematic in principle, and this shows 
that there is something wrong with moral realism. The stronger reading 
of moral explanationist aspirations is that, given the plausibility of some 
moral explanations of non-moral phenomena, we should accept the moral 
facts cited in those explanations (for example, that Hitler was morally de-
praved), thereby accepting moral realism. In other words, according to the 
stronger explanationist thesis, the plausibility of some moral explanations 
can be cited as grounds in favor of, or might constitute an argument for, 
moral realism.
In this paper I explore the relationship between theism and explana-
tionist defenses of moral realism. Where the relationship between theism 
and moral realism has been discussed, the topic of discussion has almost 
invariably concerned whether theism provides metaphysical foundations 
for moral facts. But theism has other implications for how we assess the 
plausibility of moral realism, as I aim to show here. Theists are in a particu-
larly favorable position to give an explanationist defense of moral realism, 
insofar as moral facts figure as ineliminable components of good theistic 
explanations. These moral facts are ineliminable in a manner which isn’t 
true of those moral facts cited in standard extant explanationist defenses 
of moral realism.4
Here’s the plan for the remainder of this paper. In §2 I outline Harman’s 
challenge for moral realism, from the purported fact that moral facts 
fail to explain any non-moral phenomena. In §3 I describe the standard 
explanationist reply to Harman’s challenge, focusing particularly on the 
work of Nicholas Sturgeon. In §4 I argue that, for those who accept them, 
theistic explanations provide the resources for an explanationist response 
3See, e.g., Harman, The Nature of Morality, 9.
4Here’s how this paper relates to previous publications. Robert Adams (Finite and Infinite 
Goods, 70) briefly makes two of the main points I make in this paper. I discuss his writing on 
this subject in § 4.1. Michael Rea (“Naturalism and Moral Realism”) argues that explanationist 
defenses of moral realism (or, more specifically, naturalistically acceptable explanationist 
defenses of moral realism) are best developed in terms which require theism or something 
like theism. While in this respect his thesis is like my own, the argument he gives is very 
different from the arguments I give in this paper. According to Rea, explanationists should 
be theists because they will require something like simplicity as a theoretical virtue, but 
this theoretical virtue will be justifiable only if we endorse theism (or something very much 
like theism). Dan Baras (“The Explanatory Challenge”) argues that if moral realism is not 
susceptible to a Harman-type explanatory challenge, then neither is theism. In this respect 
Baras’s thesis resembles my own, but Baras’s arguments for his thesis are very different from 
mine. The main respect in which Baras’s paper differs from my own is that Baras thinks the 
prospects for moral explanations of non-moral phenomena are dim. Baras thinks the moral 
realist, and the theist, should reject or qualify the assumption that they must meet a robust 
explanatory challenge before moral realism or theism can have epistemic justification. In this 
paper I remain neutral on that subject. Instead I argue that moral explanations are plausible, 
given that we accept certain sorts of theistic explanations.
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to Harman which avoids the defects of previous such responses. §5 con-
cludes the paper.
2. Harman’s Challenge
According to Harman, the problem with morality is “its apparent immu-
nity from observational testing.”5 Consider, for example, the following 
scenario:
You can observe someone do something, but can you ever perceive the right-
ness or wrongness of what he does? If you round a corner and see a group 
of young hoodlums pour gasoline on a cat and ignite it, you do not need 
to conclude that what they are doing is wrong; you do not need to figure 
anything out; you can see that it is wrong. But is your reaction due to the 
actual wrongness of what you see or is it simply a reflection of your moral 
‘sense,’ a ‘sense’ that you have acquired perhaps as a result of your moral 
upbringing?6
Harman argues that our moral judgments in this and similar cases are 
not “due to the actual wrongness of what we see.” In other words, the act’s 
being morally wrong does not explain why we judge it to be wrong. As 
Loeb7 points out, there seem to be two components of Harman’s argument 
that the moral wrongness (or rightness) of any act does not explain why 
we form the judgment that that act is wrong (or right), namely a simplicity 
concern and an explanatory impotence concern. It is simpler, Harman 
claims, to suppose that our moral judgments are merely the results of our 
background moral beliefs and inclinations, rather than the results of such 
beliefs and inclinations in addition to the moral facts. As Harman makes 
the point, “An assumption about moral facts would seem to be totally 
irrelevant to the explanation of your making the judgment you make. It 
would seem that all we need assume is that you have certain more or less 
well articulated moral principles that are reflected in the judgments you 
make, based on your moral sensibility.”8 The suggestion seems to be that 
since we need not posit moral facts in order to explain our moral judg-
ments, it would needlessly complicate our total theory if we were to do so. 
Presumably Harman makes this point because he thinks that we should 
avoid needlessly complex theories.
Harman’s concern regarding the explanatory impotence of moral facts 
is that there doesn’t seem to be any way, either via some sort of causal 
mechanism or in some other way, in which moral facts can have an impact 
on which moral judgments we make:
there does not seem to be any way in which the actual rightness or wrong-
ness of a given situation can have any effect on your perceptual apparatus.9
5Harman, The Nature of Morality, vii.
6Harman, The Nature of Morality, 4.
7Loeb, “Moral Explanations of Moral Beliefs,” 194–195.
8Harman, The Nature of Morality, 7.
9Harman, The Nature of Morality, 8.
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It appears to be true that there can be no explanatory chain between mor-
al principles and particular observings in the way that there can be such a 
chain between scientific principles and particular observings.10
While so far I’ve discussed Harman’s challenge for the notion that 
moral facts might explain our moral judgments, I should emphasize 
that Harman’s challenge extends to all moral explanations of non-moral 
phenomena, not just those involving moral judgments. For example, as 
we’ll see below, Sturgeon claims that the fact that some political or social 
arrangement is unjust sometimes explains the occurrence of a resulting 
revolution against that political or social arrangement. Harman would 
contend, by contrast, that whatever factors bring about the revolution in 
question, the political or social arrangement’s being unjust is not among 
them. For, first, a sufficient explanation for the revolution can be found 
in non-moral causes (for example, those non-moral features of the situ-
ation on which the situation’s being unjust is alleged to supervene). So, 
to suppose that, in addition to those non-moral features of the situation, 
the injustice of the situation also helps explain the revolution, we would 
thereby needlessly complicate to our total picture of the world. A second 
reason to believe that the situation’s being unjust does not explain the rev-
olution is because the injustice of the situation just doesn’t seem to be the 
sort of property the instantiation of which might explain or bring about 
revolutions. Moral properties like “being unjust” are unable to affect, and 
therefore unable to explain the occurrence of, the sorts of events which 
constitute revolutions.
3. The Explanationist Response to Harman’s Challenge
Since Sturgeon has done more than anyone else to describe and defend 
moral explanationism, I will restrict my attention to his views on this 
subject.11 Sturgeon thinks Harman is incorrect: not only are moral ex-
planations (that is, explanations of non-moral phenomena which make 
reference to moral facts) possible, there are in fact many such explanations 
which seem plausible. So, for example, we think Hitler was morally de-
praved, and plausibly, part of why we think Hitler was morally depraved 
is because he was morally depraved.12 More generally, there are frequently 
cases where we consider the best explanation of someone’s actions to be 
that they have such-and-such a moral character.13 Such explanations seem 
plausible and informative. In fact, “it would be difficult to find a serious 
work of biography, for example, in which actions are not explained by ap-
peal to moral character: sometimes by appeal to specific virtues and vices, 
but often enough also by appeal to a more general assessment.”14 To take 
10Harman, The Nature of Morality, 9.
11See especially Sturgeon, “Moral Explanations” and “Moral Explanations Defended.”
12Sturgeon, “Moral Explanations,” 234.
13Sturgeon, “Moral Explanations,” 243–244.
14Sturgeon, “Moral Explanations,” 244.
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another example, between the American Revolution and the Civil War, 
the American antislavery movement grew tremendously. A good partial 
explanation for this growth is that “slavery in the United States became 
a more oppressive institution during that time. The appeal in these stan-
dard explanations is straightforwardly to moral facts.”15 Further examples 
of plausible moral explanations include political revolutions which have 
resulted from unjust social or political arrangements.16
Support for all such moral explanations comes from the fact that they 
pass a particular counterfactual test:
it is natural to think that if a particular assumption is completely irrelevant to 
the explanation of a certain fact, then the fact would have obtained, and we 
could have explained it just as well, even if the assumption had been false. 
But I do not believe that Hitler would have done all he did if he had not been 
morally depraved, nor, on the assumption that he was not depraved, can I 
think of any plausible alternative explanation for his doing those things. 
Nor is it plausible that we would all have believed he was morally depraved 
even if he hadn’t been.17
Here is another example. Recall the case of the youths setting fire to 
the cat. In order to assess whether the youths’ doing something morally 
wrong helps explain our belief that they were doing something morally 
wrong, Sturgeon’s counterfactual test asks us to consider whether we 
would believe the youths were doing something morally wrong if they 
were not doing something morally wrong. But the youths’ doing some-
thing morally wrong supervenes on other features of the situation, in 
particular on the fact that they were causing needless intense suffering. 
So, a scenario in which the youths were not doing something morally 
wrong is one in which the facts upon which that moral fact supervenes 
are altered as well. So, a scenario in which the youths were not doing 
something morally wrong is one in which they are not causing needless 
intense suffering. Plausibly enough, if the youth had not been causing 
needless intense suffering then we would not believe that they were doing 
anything morally wrong. The moral explanation on offer here—namely, 
that we believe the youths were doing something morally wrong because 
they were doing something morally wrong—therefore passes Sturgeon’s 
counterfactual test, and this gives us some reason to think this moral ex-
planation is correct.
So far I’ve described Sturgeon’s explanationist response to Harman’s 
challenge. I’ll now offer a new explanationist response: some moral ex-
planations are indispensable components of good theistic explanations. As 
we’ll see, this sort of explanationist defense of moral realism has important 
advantages over previous explanationist defenses of moral realism.
15Sturgeon, “Moral Explanations,” 245.
16Sturgeon, “Moral Explanations Defended,” 244.
17Sturgeon, “Moral Explanations,” 245–246.
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4. Theistic Explanations
4.1. The Theistic Response to Harman’s Challenge
By a “theistic explanation” I mean an explanation of something in terms 
which make reference to the activities of God, where by “God” I mean an 
immaterial person who has the omni attributes generally ascribed to God 
in Western monotheism: God is omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent 
(i.e., perfectly good), etc.18 Theists often explain certain events in terms 
which make reference to God’s desires and intentions: intelligent beings 
other than God exist because God deliberately created a Universe which 
was such that it would lead to the evolution of those intelligent beings; 
such-and-such a miracle occurred because God brought the miracle about; 
such-and-such a text has the content it has because God inspired or oth-
erwise directed the writers of that text; and so forth. Some theists have 
gone so far as to say that God’s desires and intentions explain everything 
which happens. I don’t need such a strong thesis here. For my purposes I 
need only assume (if only provisionally, in order to demonstrate their rel-
evance for explanationist defenses of moral realism) that some events are 
correctly explained in terms of God’s deliberate actions, and in particular 
in terms of God’s desire that the events in question come about. Many 
people endorse theistic explanations of this sort, although the proportion 
of philosophers who endorse such explanations is small in comparison 
with the proportion of the general population which endorses such ex-
planations.19 (Of course, this same point presumably holds true for moral 
explanations as well.)
God behaves as God does (at least in part) because God is perfectly 
good. God will not perform any actions which are morally blameworthy, 
and God’s being perfectly good explains why this is so. Similarly, God 
will perform many actions which are morally exemplary, and God’s being 
perfectly good explains why this is so. So much is relatively uncontro-
versial for theists, but anything we say beyond this point is a matter of 
dispute. A common way of thinking of the matter is this: if there is some 
state of affairs which God is able to bring about, and which is better than 
18I assume that these divine attributes are unproblematic. If they are problematic, then ob-
viously theism, as I conceive of it, will not aid us in coming up with a response to Harman’s 
explanatory challenge. It will prove to be particularly important that God’s omniscience is 
capable of securing God’s moral knowledge. This assumption has been challenged (cf. Baras, 
“A Reliability Challenge to Theistic Platonism”), but not, I think, successfully. In any case, it 
would be beyond the scope of this paper to defend this point in any detail. (Although see 
Brenner, “How Does God Know That 2 + 2 = 4?” for a detailed response.)
19You can’t endorse theistic explanations if you aren’t a theist, and since all theists pre-
sumably accept some theistic explanations (minimally, the deist thinks that God’s creative 
activities explain why the universe exists), we can regard acceptance of theism as a proxy 
for acceptance of theistic explanations. Just 14.6 percent of respondents in the 2009 PhilPa-
pers survey accept or “lean toward” theism (Bourget and Chalmers, “What Do Philosophers 
Believe?” 494). By contrast, adherents of the three major Abrahamic (theistic) religions alone 
make up roughly 55 percent of the world’s population (Pew Research Center, The Global 
Religious Landscape, 9).
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every alternative state of affairs, then inevitably God brings about that 
state of affairs. Similarly, if there are multiple equally best such states of 
affairs, then God brings about one of those states of affairs. If there is no 
best state of affairs, then God at any rate brings about some state of af-
fairs which satisfies certain minimal criteria.20 (Here I leave it open what 
makes some state of affairs better than competing states of affairs. It may 
be, for example, that part of what makes some state of affairs better than 
the alternatives is that it satisfies certain deontic moral constraints, while 
the alternatives do not. I do not mean to suggest, then, that God decides 
which states of affairs to bring about purely on the basis of consequen-
tialist moral reasoning.) There are going to be important complications 
which I do not have the space here to discuss in detail, but which will 
need to be addressed by any fully fleshed out account of how God decides 
which states of affairs to bring about, or to allow to be brought about by 
others. For example, Adams21 argues that even if there is a best state of 
affairs, God is not morally obligated to bring it about. Additionally, argu-
ably there are some states of affairs which are possible, but which God is 
unable to bring about.22 God can only be expected to bring about states of 
affairs which God is able to bring about.
The important point to note is that, while it may prove difficult to spell 
out in detail exactly which states of affairs God could be expected to bring 
about, the classical theist should still maintain that God’s actions are re-
sponsive to the moral facts, in the sense that God performs many of the 
actions which God performs because God is perfectly good.
So, how does any of this get us an explanationist defense of moral re-
alism? The idea is that moral facts are particularly indispensable in most 
theistic explanations, in a manner in which they are not indispensable in 
the sorts of moral explanations which philosophers such as Sturgeon have 
appealed to. For example, if theism is involved in the best explanation for 
some event (a purported miracle, or whatever), particular moral claims 
will probably be involved in the explanation—for example, God brought 
about such-and-such an event because God is perfectly good (and this is 
the sort of event a perfectly good being could be expected to bring about), 
or it satisfied God’s desires (where God’s desires are, given God’s omnibe-
nevolence, responsive to moral facts), etc. So, moral claims act as important 
components of some good theistic explanations.23 This mirrors typical ex-
planationist arguments for moral realism. But with respect to the moral 
explanations cited by typical moral explanationists the anti-explanationist 
20Cf. Swinburne, The Existence of God, 112–123.
21Adams, “Must God Create the Best?”
22Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity, ch. 9.
23I don’t mean to suggest that all of God’s desires, intentions, and preferences are exclu-
sively determined by moral considerations. Perhaps God has some desires, intentions, or 
preferences for reasons other than the fact that they are morally good, or even for no reason 
at all (cf. Rea, The Hiddenness of God). Regardless, God’s desires, intentions, and preferences 
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can say that the moral components of those explanations are problematic, 
for multiple reasons.
First, as we’ve seen, Harman would say that moral explanations are 
objectionably complex. For example, the typical explanationist says Hitler 
did what he did because Hitler was morally depraved (where the in-
stantiation of moral depravity, suitably spelled out, is a property which 
Hitler can only have if moral realism is true). Harman’s reply, as we’ve 
seen above, is that we need not refer to Hitler’s depravity, or any other 
moral property, in order to explain his actions. We can explain Hitler’s 
actions in terms of his having certain beliefs, desires, intentions, etc. Once 
we have such an explanation of Hitler’s behavior, the attribution of moral 
properties to him becomes unnecessary. We should accept the simpler 
explanation of Hitler’s actions, an explanation in terms which do not attri-
bute moral qualities to Hitler’s actions or character traits.
Theistic moral explanations are immune to this sort of simplicity dif-
ficulty. In most (perhaps all) theistic explanations, you can’t leave out 
the component of the explanation which says that God is morally exem-
plary—leaving out that component of the explanation actually makes 
the explanation less simple. If God’s desires, intentions, etc., were not 
responsive to the moral facts, then God would have a collection of de-
sires, intentions, etc., which are not united by some common feature they 
all share. It is much simpler to suppose that God has, say, such-and-such 
desires because God is perfectly good, and those desires are the desires a 
perfectly good being might be expected to have. In other words, you need 
only posit God’s having this one property (being perfectly good), and 
God’s intentions, desires, etc., come along for free—no need to complicate 
the theistic hypothesis any further to account for God’s having those de-
sires, intentions, etc., which God has. If God is not morally good, because 
there are no moral facts, then God has various intentions and desires for 
some reason other than the fact that those intentions and desires are in 
line with the moral facts. In other words, we would be left with a less 
theoretically simple sort of theism, where, for example, God has various 
intentions and desires just as a brute fact.24
By contrast, Hitler behaved as he did because he had various desires, 
intentions, etc., which were the results of a chain of various non-moral 
historical and psychological causes. Once we’ve got those miscellaneous 
non-moral causes as explanations of Hitler’s actions, it really does seem 
gratuitous to attribute moral properties to Hitler’s desires, intentions, etc., 
must be consistent with God’s moral attributes. What’s more, as I’ve emphasized in the main 
body of the paper, theistic explanations often contain explicit appeals to God’s moral attri-
butes. 
24Of course, we might wonder why God is perfectly morally good. Is this just a brute fact, 
or is it to be explained in terms of God’s having some other property? Either option is open to 
the theist. Regarding the latter option, that God is perfectly good as a result of God’s having 
some other property, Swinburne argues that God’s perfect goodness (as well as some of the 
other properties theists have traditionally wanted to attribute to God) follows from God’s 
being omniscient and perfectly free (Swinburne, The Existence of God, 105).
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absent some independent reason to believe there are such moral proper-
ties. In other words, there are non-moral historical explanations for why 
Hitler has the non-moral psychological traits which explain his actions, 
historical explanations which render any single unifying explanation for 
why Hitler has the non-moral traits in question superfluous. By contrast, 
there are no such historical explanations for why God has the non-moral 
psychological traits which explain God’s actions (e.g., God’s desires, inten-
tions, etc.). But we can offer a unifying moral explanation for God’s having 
the psychological traits in question, in terms of God’s being perfectly 
good. This is the sense, then, in which I claim that theistic explanations are 
such that removing the moral components from such explanations makes 
them less simple. God’s moral goodness provides a relatively simple 
unifying explanation for God’s having the intentions and desires that 
God has. Attributing moral depravity to Hitler, by contrast, has no such 
unifying effect.
It may help to give an example. Suppose that one of the reasons Hitler 
behaved as he did was because he was lacking in empathy. We can pre-
sumably give a historical explanation for Hitler’s lacking empathy, in 
terms of events in Hitler’s life, choices he made at particular points in his 
life, or whatever. In this case we have non-moral historical explanations 
for Hitler’s instantiating the non-moral property in question (lacking 
empathy), and, since the instantiation of this and similar non-moral prop-
erties is sufficient to explain Hitler’s behaviour, we prima facie lack any 
motivation to ascribe an additional moral property to Hitler, being morally 
depraved. We need not posit that moral property to unify Hitler’s instan-
tiating the non-moral psychological traits in questions, since we already 
have sufficient non-moral historical explanations for Hitler’s instantiating 
those traits.
By contrast, in God’s case we have no historical explanations for God’s 
instantiating many of the non-moral psychological properties which 
might conceivably explain God’s actions. For example, suppose that one 
successful theistic explanation cites God’s creative activities as the expla-
nation for why embodied beings like us exist. Suppose that it is good that 
embodied beings like us exist. We have two competing explanations for 
why God created embodied beings like us, partial descriptions of which 
go like this:
1. God is perfectly good. So, God desires to create things which are 
good. It would be good if embodied beings like us exist. So, God 
desired to create embodied beings like us. So, God did create em-
bodied beings like us.
2. God desired to create embodied beings like us. So, God did create 
embodied beings like us.
The first explanation appeals to moral facts, most importantly the fact 
that God is perfectly good, and the fact that it would be good if embodied 
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beings like us exist. The second explanation appeals only to a non-moral 
fact, namely that God desired to create embodied beings like us. In the 
first case we can suppose that God desires to create things which are good 
because God is perfectly good, and perfectly good beings desire to create 
things which are good (modulo the complications noted above). But absent 
moral facts we can give no explanation for why God would desire to create 
embodied beings like us. That God desires to create embodied beings like 
us will presumably have to be regarded as a brute fact. Notably, there 
seem to be no available historical explanations for why God would desire 
to create embodied beings like us, in contrast with Hitler’s having various 
non-moral attributes, for which there are presumably non-moral historical 
explanations. But we can make similar points regarding explanations for 
God’s bringing about many other states of affairs. Suppose, for example, 
that God created a beautiful universe. If God is perfectly good, and if it is 
good for a beautiful universe to exist, we can give a moral explanation for 
why God created a beautiful universe. By contrast, if there are no moral 
facts, then while God may have created a beautiful universe because God 
desired to create a beautiful universe, there will be no explanation for 
why God desired to create a beautiful universe. So, absent moral facts, 
in order to explain why God created embodied beings like us we must 
appeal to one brute fact regarding God’s desires, and in order to explain 
why God created a beautiful universe we must appeal to some other brute 
facts regarding God’s desires. By contrast, given the availability of moral 
explanations, we can give a single unified moral explanation for why God 
created embodied beings like us, and for why God created a beautiful 
universe, namely an explanation appealing to God’s being perfectly good.
We can also see how the theistic moral explanationist can give a re-
sponse to Harman’s concern that moral facts are explanatorily impotent. 
God is omniscient, so there would be no problem with God’s being able 
to track moral facts. God’s (correct) moral beliefs then influence God’s 
actions, and, accordingly, those observable states of affairs we go on to 
explain in terms of God’s activities.
Of course, we can only attribute some observable states of affairs to 
God’s activities if we have reason to believe that those states of affairs 
are the sorts of states of affairs which God might be expected to bring 
about. We can only have reason to believe that if our moral beliefs are at 
least somewhat responsive to the moral facts. But now we’re just where 
Sturgeon was: how do we address Harman’s concern that moral facts are 
explanatorily impotent with respect to our moral beliefs? Theism to the 
rescue once again. With respect to our moral beliefs, Harman’s explan-
atory impotence concern is no longer a problem, since God can ensure 
that our evolutionary history (and perhaps cultural practices) would have 
given us moral belief forming faculties which are largely reliable.25 By the 
25This is a point made by a number of theists: Adams, “Divine Necessity,” 751, and Finite 
and Infinite Goods, 363–366; Swinburne, The Existence of God, 215–218; Rogers, “Evidence for 
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same token, Harman’s simplicity concern with respect to our moral beliefs 
is also no longer a problem, since, again, God would have reason to ensure 
that our moral beliefs are at least somewhat responsive to the moral facts.
It is worth mentioning in passing that these same sorts of considerations 
provide a response to some widely discussed evolutionary debunking ob-
jections to moral realism.26 Those debunking objections aim to undermine 
the epistemological status of our moral beliefs, or moral realism more gen-
erally, by appealing to the etiology of those beliefs, an etiology which, it is 
alleged, we have no reason to believe would have led to truth-conducive 
beliefs in this area. Theists, I take it, have an obvious response to this 
concern, one which resembles Descartes’ response to a more general skep-
tical worry, namely that God would ensure that our moral beliefs at least 
sometimes appropriately track moral facts. This gives us reason to think 
that the etiology of our moral beliefs, or our moral belief forming faculties 
more generally, will be to some extent truth-conducive. It is not my goal 
here to defend this idea. Rather, I’d like to note the consilience afforded 
to the theist moral realist’s treatment of moral epistemology in light of 
the fact that theism not only seems to provide a ready response to one 
important epistemological objection to moral realism (that moral facts are 
explanatorily superfluous, and therefore not worth including in our total 
theory), but also to another important epistemological objection to moral 
realism (that our moral beliefs are subject to evolutionary debunking).
Some of the points I’ve made in this section were anticipated by Ad-
ams.27 As Adams notes, in a discussion of Harman’s explanatory challenge, 
Leibniz thought that evaluative facts are explanatorily efficacious, insofar 
as God created the best of all possible worlds because it is the best of all 
possible worlds. Adams also notes that God might ensure that our moral 
belief forming faculties are more or less reliable. Here’s what Adams says 
on these subjects:
The implications (for our present topic) of identifying values with theolog-
ical properties are similar to those of identifying them with natural proper-
ties, though the identification will probably have to be supplemented with 
some theory of divine action in order to yield explanations. If excellence is 
identified with a sort of Godlikeness, for example, it will contribute to the 
explanation of the existence of some things if we can correctly suppose that 
God takes such Godlikeness as a reason for creating things. Even more im-
portant, if we suppose that God directly or indirectly causes human beings 
to regard as excellent approximately those things that are Godlike in the 
relevant way, it follows that there is a causal and explanatory connection 
between facts of excellence and beliefs that we may regard as justified about 
God From Certainty”; Linville, “The Moral Argument,” 393–417; Evans, God and Moral Ob-
ligation, 121, 179–181; Thurow, “The Defeater Version of Benacerraf’s Problem For A Priori 
Knowledge,” 1601.
26As in, e.g., Joyce, The Evolution of Morality, ch. 6, and Street, “A Darwinian Dilemma for 
Realist Theories of Value.”
27Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods, 70.
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excellence, and hence that it is in general no accident that such beliefs are 
correct when they are.28
Adams acknowledges that his brief remarks will not satisfy Harman, and 
his main response to Harman’s explanatory challenge does not rely on 
theistic considerations.29
Adams’s brief presentation of the theistic response to Harman’s ex-
planatory challenge suffers from at least two shortcomings which I’ve 
aimed to avoid. First, it is underdeveloped. In particular, it does not tell us 
why theistic moral explanations do not fall prey to the objections which 
Harman thinks undermine everyday moral explanations. Second, Adams 
seems to think that the theistic response to Harman’s explanatory chal-
lenge works only if we identify value with theological properties (i.e., if 
we identify excellence with “a sort of Godlikeness”). But this feature of 
Adams’s theistic response to Harman’s explanatory challenge seems to me 
to be unnecessary. God will create excellent things whether or not excel-
lence is identified with “a sort of Godlikeness.”
4.2. So What?
At this point a significant worry raises its head. We may very well be 
interested in the various possible responses to Harman’s explanatory 
challenge, and their relative strengths and weaknesses. And perhaps the 
theistic response to Harman’s challenge is of some interest insofar as it has 
certain advantages over other responses to Harman’s challenge. But what 
should primarily interest us is whether or not Harman’s challenge suc-
ceeds, and in particular whether we should, in light of Harman’s challenge, 
abandon moral realism. The theistic response to Harman’s challenge will 
only appeal to people who are already theists. Theists, in light of their as-
cription of moral attributes to God, will already be moral realists. So, what 
use is the theistic response to Harman in helping us to decide whether or 
not we should be moral realists?
The theistic moral explanationism discussed in this paper is philosoph-
ically significant for several reasons, even if it is not intended to convince 
anyone that moral realism is true (or, for that matter, that theism is true).
First, it can reassure the theist that they need not be worried about 
Harman’s challenge to moral realism. This is especially important if theism 
more or less requires moral realism.
Second, it lends some limited support to the thesis that only theists can 
rationally endorse moral realism. I can’t hope to show that there are no 
non-theistic responses which might also defuse Harman’s explanatory 
challenge, as that would require that I canvas the large literature on the 
subject, in order to refute every extant non-theistic response to Harman’s 
challenge. That’s not something I can hope to accomplish in a single paper. 
What I have tried to accomplish, however, is to show that the theist has 
28Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods, 70.
29See Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods, 70–77.
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distinctive resources which help them respond to Harman’s challenge, 
resources which aren’t obviously available to non-theists. While a number 
of philosophers have defended the thesis that one should accept theism 
if one accepts moral realism, this thesis has not to my knowledge been 
defended in the manner in which I’ve defended it here.
Third, until now moral explanationists have only been willing to defend 
metaethical naturalism (this includes all of the prominent explanationists: 
Sturgeon, Railton, and Brink, for example).30 Explanationists have always 
thought that moral facts can figure as components in good explanations of 
non-moral phenomena only if moral facts are natural facts. Here are some 
representative quotations:
The idea of causal interaction with moral reality certainly would be intoler-
ably odd if moral facts were held to be sui generis; but there need be nothing 
odd about causal mechanisms for learning moral facts if these facts are con-
stituted by natural facts, and that is the view under consideration.31
Many evaluative explanations of non-evaluative facts look like causal expla-
nations: decency prevents people from doing certain things; injustice, like 
poverty, can provoke rebellions. And it is hard to see how moral proper-
ties like decency and injustice could have these effects unless they were real 
features of the world. Many philosophers also find it hard to see how they 
could have such effects in the natural world unless they were themselves 
natural properties. . . . So, the acceptability of these explanations, if they are 
acceptable, would seem to provide an argument against skeptical views that 
would deny the existence of such properties, and also an argument that the 
properties in question are natural ones.32
The theistic moral explanationist can be a metaethical naturalist, but 
they are also free to be a metaethical non-naturalist. The theist will gener-
ally not be moved by prohibitions on the inclusion of non-natural entities 
or properties in causal explanations. What’s more, the particular causal 
relations at issue will be less problematic for the theistic moral explana-
tionist. How do non-natural moral properties (or events involving such 
properties) have effects in the natural world? Here’s how: they explain 
God’s having particular desires or intentions, and God in turn engages 
in activities (as a result of God’s having the desires or intentions in ques-
tion) which explain certain natural events. At no point need the causal 
or explanatory chain be broken simply because the moral properties in-
volved are non-natural: God, being omniscient, has no trouble tracking 
the non-natural moral facts, and God, being omnipotent, has no trouble 
intervening in the natural world. (And even if it is problematic to suppose 
that moral facts cause God to have particular beliefs, desires, intentions, 
30Although it should be noted that they disagree among themselves about how best 
to characterize metaethical naturalism—e.g., whether we should endorse a reductive or a 
non-reductive version of naturalism.
31Railton, “Moral Realism,” 171; see also 185.
32Sturgeon, “Moral Explanations Defended,” 244.
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or whatever, we need not suppose that moral facts causally explain God’s 
having those beliefs, desires, etc. Perhaps, for example, the moral facts 
ground, rather than cause, God’s beliefs, desires, etc. Or perhaps moral 
facts enter into some other sort of non-causal explanatory relation with 
God’s beliefs, desires, etc.33)
A fourth philosophically significant feature of the theistic moral expla-
nationism discussed in this paper is that it provides a novel perspective 
on the relationship between theism and moral realism. Usually, when that 
relationship is discussed, what is discussed is whether God provides any 
sort of metaphysical foundation for moral facts.34 Sometimes the alleged 
need for such a foundation forms the basis for an argument for the ex-
istence of God.35 The theistic moral explanationist need not assume that 
God provides any sort of metaphysical foundation for moral facts. What’s 
more, while theists have sometimes appealed to moral realism as grounds 
in favor of theism, the theistic moral explanationist turns things around: 
we should be moral realists because we are theists, or at any rate because we 
have reason to believe there are good theistic explanations, and that moral 
facts are indispensable components of those explanations.36
A fifth and final point worth mentioning is this. Among other objec-
tions to moral explanations, Leiter says that
if we go outside the contemporary philosophical debate and look to scholars 
in other disciplines actually concerned with explanatory questions, I think 
we will be hardpressed to find anyone doing serious explanatory work with 
moral facts. Outside of informal ways of speaking and ‘folk explanations,’ 
moral facts appear to play no role in any developed explanatory theory37
Theistic moral explanationism reminds us that there is at least one aca-
demic discipline, theology, in which moral facts have and continue to play 
an important explanatory role.
5. Conclusion
A major challenge to moral realism has been the objection, most prom-
inently associated with Harman, that moral facts do not explain any 
non-moral facts. And if moral facts do no such explanatory work, why 
should we include them in our total picture of the world? Sturgeon and 
other explanationists have, in response to Harman, provided what they 
33On this subject see Brenner, “How Does God Know That 2 + 2 = 4?”
34See, for example, Jordan, “Theism, Naturalism, and Meta-Ethics.”
35As in, for example, Adams, “Moral Arguments for Theism.” 
36Some theists, perhaps sympathetic to this paper’s general theiss, might be tempted to 
argue that the fact that theistic explanations provide the resources for an explanationist de-
fense of moral realism provides some grounds in favor of theism. Zagzebski (“Does Ethics 
Need God?”) and Linville (“The Moral Argument,” 393–417) give similar arguments for 
theism, from the purported fact that theism helps us avoid important epistemological wor-
ries for moral realism. I’m not sure what to think about this sort of argument, so I won’t try 
to settle the matter here.
37Leiter, “Moral Facts and Best Explanations,” 94.
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take to be counterexamples to the claim that moral facts do no explana-
tory work. In this paper I’ve built on the work of previous explanationists. 
Here I’ve argued that theistic explanations (explanations which make ref-
erence to God’s activities) provide a particularly compelling foundation 
for the moral explanationist defense of moral realism. Theistic explana-
tions often make reference to moral facts, and do so in a manner which is 
ineliminable in an important respect—remove the moral facts from those 
explanations, and they suffer as a result. In this respect theistic moral ex-
planations seem to differ from the sorts of moral explanations typically 
offered by moral explanationists. I’ve also argued that the theistic moral 
explanationist defense of moral realism has at least one other important 
advantage over previous moral explanationist defenses of moral realism: 
moral explanationists have always been metaethical naturalists, but the 
theistic moral explanationist can be either a metaethical naturalist or a 
non-naturalist. We might also note that my defense of theistic moral ex-
planations shows that, in principle, there can be good moral explanations 
of non-moral phenomena. One way of interpreting Harman has Harman 
arguing that, in principle, we cannot have any moral explanations of this 
sort. Theistic moral explanationism refutes this thesis, whether or not 
theism is true.
Many of the points I’ve made in this paper could perhaps be appro-
priated by proponents of axiarchism, the view that evaluative facts can 
be directly causally efficacious.38 John Leslie, the leading contemporary 
proponent of this view, thinks that the world exists, and has certain prop-
erties, because it is good that the world exist and have those properties.39 
Axiarchism can be treated as an explanatory theory, so that (perhaps) 
axiarchism’s being true can be cited as the best explanation for why the 
world exists and has such-and-such properties. But, of course, if axiar-
chism is true, then realism with respect to some evaluative facts is true 
as well. It seems, then, that axiarchism is very receptive to an explana-
tionist approach to evaluative realism (if not moral realism specifically). 
Perhaps similar points could be made about the thesis that some events 
happen as a result of earned karmic merit.40 On this view, some non-moral 
facts (e.g., the events which happen to someone) are explained in terms of 
evaluative facts, namely in terms of the extent to which one has accrued 
good or bad karmic merit as a result of one’s past actions. If karmic laws 
are justified on explanatory grounds then this might provide another way 
to develop an explanationist defense of moral realism. Perhaps this sort 
of explanationist defense of moral realism would have defects which are 
not present in the theistic explanationist defense of moral realism, aside 
38A point also briefly hinted at in Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods, 64–65.
39Cf. Leslie, Value and Existence.
40Thanks to Brian Barnett for bringing this point to my attention. The thesis that karmic 
laws operate in the manner described here may be a version of axiarchism, as I’ve character-
ized the latter thesis.
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from the more general fact that we might think karmic explanations are 
less plausible than theistic explanations. I’ll leave a full discussion of this 
subject for another occasion.41
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